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Abstract: We construct an n-period, constrained optimization model where the authoritarian 
ruler maximizes expected rents subject to budget constraint of available surplus. We show 
that the larger state capacity is in the previous period, the worse environmental quality will be 
in the next period: while both infrastructural investment and environmental protection 
increase with state capacity, the former increases at a faster rate which enlarges the gap 
between the two --- the environmental investment gap. Given infrastructural public goods 
typically damage the environment, the larger this gap is the worse the environmental quality 
would be. This follows from rulers’ optimizing logic of equating marginal returns once we 
assume the declining marginal productivity of factors of production of surplus. We model 
three types of air and water pollutants in autocracies as a function of state capacity and other 
relevant variables. State capacity is associated with higher levels of all three types of 
pollutants.  
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Introduction 
In 1980, 55.9 per cent of the world population lived under some form of authoritarian rule. 
By 2000, after waves of democratization, this number was still as high as 42.1 per cent.
1
 How 
does authoritarian politics affect countries’ environmental performances? This is an important 
and yet unanswered question for students of political science. Previous research on the 
environmental impact of political institutions often focuses on the democracy-non-democracy 
divide (Congleton 1992, Li and Reuveny 2006). Some have argued that liberal-democracy 
could be detrimental to environmental protection (Dryzek 1987, Midlarsky 1998). More 
recent research seems to suggest that democracies are often associated with more stringent 
environmental regulations and sometimes better environmental outcomes (Barret and Graddy 
2000; Esty and Porter 2005; Bernauer and Koubi 2008). However, given the fact that 
different kinds of authoritarianism differ from each other as much as they differ from 
democracy (Geddes 1999), we need to further investigate the dynamics of environmental 
politics in the authoritarian world.  
Unfortunately, we know little about environmental politics in authoritarian systems. 
This is understandable because the types of political institutions often studied by students of 
social sciences are usually missing from authoritarian politics. For instance, political 
economy models of electoral rules (proportional representation vs. majoritarian) and 
democratic political regimes (presidential vs. parliamentary system) have informed the recent 
environmental politics literature that connects these formal institutions to environmental 
policy outputs and outcomes (Fredriksson and Millimet  2004; Fredriksson and Wollscheid 
2007; Broz and Maliniak 2011). However, these models are based on democratic politics and 
                                                          
1
 These mainly comprise single-party, military, personalistic, monarchical, and their hybrid 
regimes. Percentages are calculated by the authors, using Wright 2008’s extension of Geddes’ 
data of authoritarian regime types (Geddes 1999). Note these are likely to underestimate the 
number of people living under authoritarian rules, because there are non-democratic regimes 
that are not yet classified by the data. 
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therefore provide little help when it comes to understand the dynamics of environmental 
politics in non-democratic systems.  
Our understanding of politics in authoritarian systems is also much more limited than 
that of democratic systems. Recent literature on authoritarianism has focused on the 
classification of authoritarian regimes (Geddes 1999, Lai and Slater 2006, Cheibub and 
Gandhi 2004, Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland 2009) and the links between these regime types 
and various phenomena such as regime survival (Geddes 2003), democratic transition and 
consolidation (Svolic 2008), economic development (Gandhi 2008, Wright 2008), and 
initiation of conflicts (Pickering and Kisangani 2010, Weeks 2011). Though there is an 
abundant case study literature on environmental regulations and outcomes in authoritarian 
systems (Mumme, Bath, and Assetto 1988; Pryde 1991; Economy 2004; Doyle and Simpson 
2006), unfortunately little systematic theoretical work has been carried out, and we lack 
systematic studies of how outcomes are related to variance among authoritarian systems.   
In this paper, we present a model of environmental politics in an authoritarian system 
starting with the basic assumption of a rent-maximizing authoritarian ruler. We construct an 
n-period, constrained optimization model where the authoritarian ruler maximizes expected 
rents subject to the budget constraint of the surplus that he has available in the short-term. We 
show that it is typically the case that the larger state capacity is at time t, the worse 
environmental quality at time t+1: strong state capacity increases both infrastructural 
investment and environmental protection, but as long as the productivity of infrastructural 
investment relative to its price is greater than that of environmental protection, the former 
would increase at a faster rate, which enlarges the gap between the two. We call this the 
environmental investment gap. Based on the assumption that infrastructural public goods are 
typically provided in a way that damages the environment, we argue that the bigger the gap is 
the worse environmental quality will be. This result follows from rulers’ optimizing logic of 
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equating marginal returns once we assume the declining marginal productivity of factors of 
production of surplus.  
We test our theory by modeling three types of major air and water pollutants, sulphur 
dioxide (SO2), carbon dioxide (CO), and biological oxygen demand (BOD) in authoritarian 
states as a function of the capacity of the state and a battery of relevant variables, for 1980-
2003. The results strongly support our theory. Higher state capacity is associated with higher 
levels of all three types of pollutants. The rest of the paper describes our theoretical model, 
presents data and variable operationalizations, and finally discuss the empirical findings and 
direction of future research.    
 A Model of Environmental Politics in Authoritarian States 
Rulers can obtain surplus either by extracting part of the national income stream or by selling 
or running down parts of the national stock of capital that they control. In attempting to 
maximize the rents rulers in authoritarian regimes enjoy through monopoly of state power, 
they face a short-term long-term tradeoff. The surplus the authoritarian ruler (hereafter 
“ruler”) has extracted at time t might be enjoyed as rent at that time. On the other hand the 
ruler could invest it so as to enjoy higher future rents at t’ > t. First the ruler can invest in 
capital which increases the size of future national income. Second he can invest in additional 
state capacity, which will allow him to extract a greater surplus in the future. Third he may 
make investments in legitimacy, which increases the probability that he will survive in office 
until the next time period. We discuss each of these forms of investment in turn. 
Part of surplus is extracted from national income. National income is produced by labor, 
capital, infrastructural public goods and environmental public goods. We assume a fixed 
supply of labor and capital in the hands of private owners. Positive investment by the ruler in 
infrastructural public goods such as roads and energy systems should increase future national 
income. On the other hand a ruler might run down the stock of infrastructural capital to 
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increase the rent he enjoys at t, with negative consequences for future national income. 
Infrastructural capital depreciates. One way of running it down is simply not to maintain it, 
for example, not to make road repairs. Environmental public goods are also important to 
production, and rulers can invest in future income by protecting them, through implementing 
environmental regulations. Again a ruler can disinvest, pushing up the surplus he extracts in 
the short term at the cost of lower future income. For example he may exploit national forests 
unsustainably, selling off the timber or allowing his cronies to do so, which we treat as an 
erosion of environmental protection.  
We assume that the environmental quality at t is a function of the difference between 
the levels of infrastructural public goods and environmental protection in that period – the 
environmental investment gap. This is based on the assumption that infrastructural public 
goods are typically provided in a way that damages the environment. Of course this is not 
always true, for instance a more efficient electricity distribution system enhances the 
environment. We simply bypass this issue by definition by categorizing such an investment 
as an environmental investment. Rulers control state capacity. If they invest in extra state 
capacity at t, other things equal they should be able to enjoy higher future rents (Besley and 
Persson 2010). However they may also disinvest. For instance they could run down the size 
of the military and sell the assets freed up. Again this would allow them to enjoy higher rents 
in the short term.  
In addition to controlling state capacity, authoritarian rulers – similar to their 
counterparts in democratic states – are interested in survival in office. Extant studies in fact 
suggest that since democratic leaders rely on a larger winning coalition for political survival 
compared to authoritarian rulers, incumbents in democracies tend to supply public rather than 
private goods to garner political support from members in the larger winning coalitions (Lake 
and Baum 2001; Bueno de Mesquita et al 2003). This is because public goods by definition 
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are supplied broadly, and it is relatively cheaper and more efficient for democratic leaders to 
provide such goods to their larger support base to prolong their survival in office (Bueno de 
Mesquita et al 2003). Unlike democratic leaders, rulers in authoritarian regimes often depend 
on support from a smaller winning coalition to retain power. Relying on support from a 
smaller winning coalition makes it more feasible and efficient for authoritarian rulers to 
provide private good transfers to narrow group of supporters to maximize their likelihood of 
political survival (Bueno de Mesquita et al 2003). Since our model analyzes environmental 
politics in an authoritarian regime, we build on the studies mentioned above and assume that 
the (i) authoritarian ruler focuses on supplying private good transfers to his small core group 
of supporters and (ii) the probability a ruler survives until the next time period increases with 
the amount he provides in private transfers to his supporters. Of course such private good 
transfers cannot take negative values, because income is extracted from the generality of 
citizens, not the selectorate. We also assume that public good provision, whether 
infrastructural or environmental, does not increase the chances of survival. Public goods are 
available both to a larger segment of the population in the selectorate and to those in the 
winning coalition, so they provide no particular motive for members in the smaller winning 
coalition to support the ruler.
2
  
The ruler plans investment over a finite number of periods 0 ≤ t ≤ T, where T ≥ 2 is the 
maximum period he believes he could possible stay in office. T could be set by institutional 
rules, such as those governing succession in the Chinese Communist Party, or by beliefs 
about biological longevity. The ruler does not necessarily expect to survive this long in office, 
though. Denote the subjective probability that he will survive until time t by Πt, with Π0 =1 
since the ruler is in office at the time of plan formulation. Let st be the level of private good 
                                                          
2
 If private goods only provide services that can be enjoyed if adequate levels of public goods 
are also available this would not generally be the case. For instance a member of the 
selectorate could only enjoy privileged access to a private car to the extent to which 
uncrowded roads exist to drive on. We do not attempt to model this aspect here. 
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transfers to members of the selectorate at time t. Notice that a constraint (denoted as “C”) on 
the ruler is such that 
                 C1: st ≥ 0  
since we assume surplus is not extracted from the selectorate. The probability that the ruler 
survives from period t to period t+1, 0 ≤  t < T will be denoted by πt, 0 < πt  < 1,  assumed to 
be a strictly increasing function of st.
3
 Further we assume Πt+1 = πt Πt   0 ≤  t < T. Notice this 
is to treat survival between periods as a sequence of  stochastically independent events. 
Let the levels of infrastructural public goods, environmental protection, and state 
capacity at time t be It, Et and Ct, respectively. Let investments at time t in these things be it, 
et and ct respectively. Recalling that the ruler can disinvest up to the point that all these 
factors are used up, the ruler also faces constraints:  
 C2:   it  ≥  -It  
C3:   et  ≥ - Et 
C4:   ct ≥ - Ct 
Total levels of  the three factors accumulate through investment from t = 0. Thus, for instance, 
for t > 0                                      
                                         t-1 
                          It = Io + ∑it’.  
                                        t’=0  
 
Let Yt be the surplus that the ruler has extracted from national income at time t. Then a 
further constraint is that 
            C5: Yt  ≥    st +  pI it + pE et + pC ct  
                                                          
3
 Transferring private goods to his core group of supporters helps an autocrat to reward such 
members in the narrow winning coalition for their loyalty (Bueno de Mesquita et al 2003). 
This reduces the incentives for such supporters to overthrow their autocratic leader which in 
turn serves to increase the leader’s probability of survival in office (Bueno de Mesquita et al 
2003). This explains why we assume that πt is a strictly increasing function of st.    
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where the price of private goods is 1, so they are the numeraire, and pI, pE and pC are the 
prices of infrastructural public goods, environmental protection and state capacity, 
respectively. Notice that if the ruler disinvests in infrastructure, say, this constraint becomes 
easier to satisfy. Implicitly it allows both for extraction from income and running down 
capital.  This is an important technical feature of our model as it formally incorporates the 
dynamic from the literature of dictatorships that authoritarian rulers (unlike democratic 
leaders) are more likely to engage in “predation” in office that leads to income extraction and 
a decline in capital (e.g. Grossman and Noh 1990; McGuire and Olson 1996).   
Take Yo as given. For 0 < t ≤ T we assume Yt depends on a Cobb-Douglas ‘surplus 
production function’: 
            Yt(It, Et, Ct) = A It 
α  
Et
 β  
Ct
γ
 
where A > 0 and 0 <  α, β,  γ < 1. Notice that α, β, and γ measure the productivity for the 
ruler’s surplus of, respectively, infrastructure, environmental protection and state capacity.  
Also notice that we assume that investments only affect surplus extracted in subsequent time 
periods. 
         The ruler’s rent in period t is Rt = Yt  - (st +  pI it + pE et + pC ct). Subject to constraints 
C1 through C5 above and initial investment stocks I0, E0, and C0, with dicount parameter φ, 0 
< φ < 1, he seeks to maximize discounted, expected rents over his maximum period in office 
                                 T 
                    R∑    =  ∑ φ
t
 Πt Rt 
                                t=0   
The fact that the authoritarian ruler in our model seeks to maximize his discounted rents is 
drawn from models of dictatorships which assume that “dictators want to maximize their 
rent” (Gandhi and Przeworski 2006:2; also see Wintrobe 1990; Grossman and Noh 1990).  
The assumption of a rent-maximizing authoritarian ruler is distinct from models of trade or 
fiscal policymaking in democracies which typically assume that democratic incumbents 
maximize a weighted objective function in which the incumbent weighs social welfare and 
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contributions from interest groups (Grossman and Helpman 1994; Battaglini and Coate 2008). 
The distinction alluded to above is vital considering that our model focuses on authoritarian 
regimes. It also has important substantive implications that are explored below. 
At this stage, it is easily seen from the expression for R∑ that only an extremely future-
orientated ruler would take no rents at time t, investing his entire surplus for that round. To 
rule out this empirically unlikely occurrence we assume C5 is slack. We also assume 
constraints C1-C4 are slack on the grounds that it is probably impractical for rulers to 
completely disinvest during their lifetimes. So we avoid discussion of corner solutions to the 
program, focusing on the properties of the internal solution.   
Environmental quality at t+1, 0 <  t+1 <  T,  is assumed to be a function of the 
environmental investment deficit Dt+1  = (It + it) – (Et + et), recalling that total factor levels at 
time t+1 are the sum of the lagged value at t plus additional investments at t. The 
environmental quality function, εt+1(Dt+1), is such that δεt+1 /δDt+1 < 0. In the online appendix 
we show that
4
  
              Dt+1 = ((αpE – βpI) (kt + pIIt + pEEt + pCCt))/(pIpE(α + β + γ)) 
Where kt is the amount invested, excluding what is spent on private goods going to the 
selectorate. Then Dt increases with It, Et and Ct so long as αpE  > βpI  or α/pI   > β/pE, which is 
to say that the productivity of surplus of infrastructural investment relative to its price is 
greater than that of environmental protection.
5
  
Because we can operationally measure state capacity, we focus discussion on this term. 
The larger the stock of state capacity Ct, the lower the level of environmental quality at time 
t+1 so long as the productivity of infrastructural investment relative to its price is greater than 
the productivity of environmental investment relative to its price. If we assume additionally 
                                                          
4
 We solve for and formally characterize Dt+1 in the “proof of Lemma 1” in the appendix. 
5
 We show in the “proof of Proposition 1” in the appendix that Dt strictly increases with 
respect to Ct  
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that at relatively low levels of development infrastructural investment is typically more 
productive of ruler surplus than environmental investment,
6
 then: 
H1: Other things equal, the higher the level of state capacity the lower the level of 
environmental quality in authoritarian systems at relatively low levels of development. 
 
The mechanism behind this result is as follows. Constraints are assumed slack so at the 
optimum the ruler equates the marginal productivity of surplus with respect to factors across 
his possible investments. Moreover the marginal productivity of factors is declining, because 
of the ‘Cobb-Douglas’ production function. The larger Ct is the lower is marginal 
productivity of state capacity before investment/disinvestment. So the larger Ct is the further 
investment in infrastructure and the environment are pushed in equilibrium.
7
 A greater stock 
of state capacity increases both infrastructural investment and environmental protection, but 
the investment gap grows if infrastructural investment grows more in relative terms, which it 
will if it is relatively more productive of surplus.
8
 
Stated in more simple language, one key implication that emerges from the model’s 
technical mechanism summarized above is that greater state capacity will rationally induce 
autocrats to increase investment in infrastructure and the environment. To see why, first note 
that increasing investment in infrastructure reduces intermediate input costs that raises 
economic output (World Bank 2012). Higher output that results from infrastructure 
                                                          
6 Research by development economists and the World Bank suggests that infrastructural 
investment in developing states positively affects the economy’s output and productivity 
through a variety of channels (Esfahani and Ramirez 2003;World Bank 2012). Infrastructure 
investment reduces the costs of intermediate inputs used for production. It also directly 
enhances productivity, increases private capital formation (by raising expected returns on 
private investments as the marginal productivity of inputs increases or transaction costs decline) 
and facilitates the exploitation of agglomeration economies. It is thus plausible – as we 
presume – that the productivity of surplus of infrastructural investment relative to its price not 
only grows sharply in autocracies (since autocracies only exist in the developing world) but is 
also greater than that of environmental protection.  
7
 We formally substantiate this claim in the appendix. 
8
 However there may be atypical cases of highly polluted systems where it is more productive 
of surplus at the margin for a ruler to invest in environmental protection (i.e. α/pI   < β/pE). 
We return to this possibility in the conclusion. 
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investment not only generates more capital but also provides an opportunity for authoritarian 
rulers to extract more rent from the larger pool of capital realized from higher output. 
Because the authoritarian ruler in our model seeks to maximize his discounted rents, he thus 
has incentives to raise output via investment in infrastructure as this produces more rent for 
the ruler. This argument is similar to Gandhi and Przeworski’s (2006: 2) claim that dictators 
“always seek to maximize total output: even if they are forced to share rents with some 
groups of the potential opposition, their rents are higher when total output is higher”. Note, 
however, that the authoritarian ruler’s incentive to extract more rent by raising output via 
infrastructural investment is a necessary but not sufficient condition for increasing investment 
in infrastructure.  
Rather our model predicts that greater state capacity provides the ruler with the 
necessary economic ability required to invest more in infrastructure which raises output and 
consequently leads to higher realized rent for the ruler. Furthermore, since the authoritarian 
ruler is less politically constrained than democratic leaders, he has sufficient political room 
for maneuver to employ greater state capacity to generate more rent by (as explicated above) 
raising output via increasing infrastructure investment. Our model also suggests that greater 
state capacity provides the ruler with more leverage to invest in the environment.  Investing 
in the environment curtails production bottle-necks by reducing negative externalities and 
this in turn further boosts output which generates more rent for the authoritarian ruler. 
Although greater state capacity has a positive effect on infrastructural and environmental 
investment, we find in our model that the environmental investment gap grows if – as 
discussed above – infrastructural investment grows more than environmental investment; this 
occurs when the former is relatively more productive of surplus. 
In contrast to authoritarian rulers, democratic incumbents on average place more weight 
on maximizing social welfare rather than rent (Lake and Baum 2001). They are also more 
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institutionally constrained by de facto opposition parties in the legislature whose policy 
preferences may diverge from the incumbents “ideal-point” and whose interests are unlikely 
to be consistent with maximizing the incumbent’s discounted rents. Since democratic leaders 
place more weight on increasing social welfare rather than rent-extraction, their incentives to 
use state capacity to generate more rent by raising output are low compared to authoritarian 
rulers. Higher institutional constraints faced by democratic leaders also make it substantially 
more difficult for these leaders to employ state capacity to implement policies – e.g. 
increasing investment in infrastructure and the environment – that they may prefer as 
opposition parties can credibly veto such policies. Thus unlike authoritarian regimes, we 
anticipate that higher state capacity is likely to have a negligible and insignificant (in the 
statistical sense) impact on environmental investment gap in democracies.      
Data and Measurement 
Air and Water Pollution:  In order to test the impact of the capacity of the state on the 
environment, we choose to focus on three major types of air and water pollution with 
available data covering enough countries and years: Sulphur dioxide (SO2), carbon dioxide 
(CO2), and bio-chemical oxygen demand (BOD).
9
 Sulphur dioxide is a serious air pollutant, 
implicated in ground-level smog and haze, particularly in urban areas. It is associated with 
damage to human health and it reduces agricultural productivity and. It often results in acid-
deposition, which damages vulnerable aquatic and forest ecosystems and buildings (Hill 
2004). Around two-thirds of emissions result from fossil fuel-burning electricity generation. 
In developed countries the trend has been towards reductions in emissions due to changes to 
                                                          
9
 We choose not to model  environmental policies and regulations because recent studies have 
shown that even with stringent laws on the books, governments can and often do cut 
enforcement budgets, reduce penalties for enforcement violations, and adopt administrative 
policies, all of which undermine enforcement effectiveness of policies (Cao and Prakash 
2012). And we expect that the gap between law on paper and environmental outcomes is 
likely to be large especially for developing countries. 
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less sulphurous fossil fuels, deindustrialization, domestic legislation such as the US Clean Air 
Act of 1973, pollution control technologies encouraged by regional arrangements like the 
1988 EU Large Combustion Plant Directive, and the international Convention of Long-Range 
Transboundary Air Pollution. However, emissions are still increasing in rapidly growing 
developing countries many of which are authoritarian regimes. We measure sulphur dioxide 
emissions in kilograms per-capita per year.
10
 We take the logarithm of all three dependent 
variables to rescale extreme values and approximate a normal distribution. 
Carbon dioxide is the most significant anthropogenic forcing factor for climate 
change.
11
 Hence it is also implicated in an enormous range of problems, including potential 
food scarcity, health, development, security, and loss of biodiversity. It has been under 
intense discussion since the late 1980s, primarily under the umbrella of the 1992 Framework 
Convention on Climate Change. Despite the entering into force of the 1997 Kyoto Protocol in 
2005, regional action such as the EU Emissions Trading Scheme, and action at state and local 
scales, policy has had little impact to date. We use CO2 emissions in metric tonnes per capita 
from the World Bank’s Development Indicators. Emissions have fallen in some countries 
since the 1980s partly as a consequence of shifts in fuel or closing polluting heavy industry.  
Bio-chemical oxygen demand (BOD) is an important indicator of water pollution and it 
measures the amount of oxygen required to decompose a given amount of organic pollutant. 
Organic matter entering rivers and lakes is decomposed by micro-organisms, and their 
activity depletes the oxygen dissolved in the water. Beside natural flows of organic matter, 
there are flows from sewage discharge and from industrial processes like paper production. 
These flows push up bio-chemical oxygen demand, and in the extreme can lead to the water 
becoming hypoxic and unable to support life (Hill 2004). The measure we draw from World 
Bank Development Indicators is based on the standard test for this form of environmental 
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 See Stern 2005.  
11
 Other pollutants have greater forcing potential per-unit, though.  
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stress, bio-chemical oxygen demand in kilograms per-day, per-capita. This is, then, a measure 
of anthropogenic organic pollution of waterways.
12
  
State Capacity: In order to capture the concept of the capacity of the state, we use two 
different fiscal measures of state capacity from Arbetman-Rabinowitz and Johnson (2007):  
the state’s tax revenue as a ratio of GDP (Tax ratio) and relative political capacity (RPC).13  
Tax ratio measures states’ ability to extract resources from individuals and groups in society; 
it is the conventional gauge of the state’s extractive capacity (Campbell 1993; Cheibub, 1998; 
Centeno, 2002; Thies, 2005 and 2010). Relative political capacity (RPC) further 
conceptualizes state’s relative political capacity as the “the ability of a government to extract 
resources from a population given their level of economic development” (Arbetman-
Rabinowitz and Johnson 2007, 2). It is a measure of the strength of the state compared to 
other states with similar levels of development and resource endowments.  
RPC is an index that compares the actual level of tax revenue extraction to a predicted 
level of extraction. Predicted revenues are estimated as a function of per capita income, the 
share of agriculture in the economy, the share of mining in the economy, and major oil 
production. A state that scores 1 on the RPC indicator is extracting exactly as one would 
expect compared to other states with similar conditions, while those that score higher than 1 
are extracting more than expected and those that score lower than 1 are extracting less than 
expected. The relative political capacity score was originally developed by Organski and 
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 Inorganic pollution, for instance, that due to run-off of nitrates and phosphates from 
agriculture, may also deplete oxygen by generating algal blooms, but BOD is not a direct 
measure of this, and we know of no internationally comparable data. 
13
 Other measures of state capacity are also often used in the literature, such as government 
consumption and government total revenue. However, we think these alternative measures 
are problematic for our purposes. Government consumption is a measure of the amount of a 
society’s resources consumed by government. It measures expenditures, rather than revenue 
gathering activity. Total government revenue is a measure of the government’s income that 
includes both tax and non-tax revenue. It is not typically seen as the best measure of revenue 
extraction, since it contains non-tax revenue. 
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Kugler (1980) as a proxy for states’ relative ability to wage war, and has proven useful in 
conflict studies (Ties 2010) and in recent work on carbon emissions (Sprinz et al. 2009).  
Authoritarian Regime Types: Our theoretical model focuses the effect of state capacity in 
authoritarian states. We adopt a parsimonious approach in which the ruler’s only incentive is 
to maximize the expected surplus that she can extract from the society. However, other 
factors might also systematically affect ruler’s choice between infrastructures and 
environmental public goods. Geddes has shown that different authoritarian states constitute 
different political “games” for rulers and their key supporters by providing them with 
different incentive structures (Geddes 1999): for instance, in a single-party regime, factions 
within the party often play a stag hunt game, so it is better for them to stay in rather than 
leaving the party, which accounts for the resilience of this type of regime. It is plausible that 
systematic differences between these authoritarian regime types affect ruler’s policy choices, 
including those affecting the environment. For instance, leaders in regimes that tend to last 
longer (e.g., single-party regimes) might have a longer time horizon and therefore are more 
likely to care about the environment. In addition to time horizons (which are hard to measure 
empirically), regime types might proxy other systematic differences between authoritarian 
systems such as the size of distributional coalitions (Peceny and Butler 2004; Wright 2009; 
Chang and Golden 2010; Pickering and Kisangani 2010).
14
 It is therefore important for us to 
control for authoritarian regime types in the empirical analysis.  We follow Geddes’ typology 
of authoritarian regimes and use an extended version of the data from Wright 2008.
15
 There 
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 Rulers lacking easily available revenue such as foreign aid or rents from natural resources 
are often under considerable pressure when they need to provide payoffs to members of large 
distributional coalitions. They are more likely to over-exploit natural resources and the 
environment in order to survive.      
15
 Note that Geddes originally offered a straightforward classification of regimes as military, 
personalist, and single-party: in military regimes, a group of officers decides who will rule 
and influence policy; in single party regimes, one party dominates access to political office 
and controls policy; in personalist regimes, access to office and the fruits of office depends on 
the discretion of an individual leader. The original data spanned from 1950 to 2000, but did 
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are some hybrid regimes coded in the data (e.g., military-personalist and single-party-
military). These hybrid regimes might exhibit characteristics of two or more of the two pure 
regime types. Therefore, we choose to focus on the four pure types of authoritarian regime 
types to capture the authoritarian regime type effects.
16
  
Socialist/Communist Legacies: Communist regimes have often adopted a progressivist 
perspective based on Marx and Engels’ idea that the road to communism lies through the 
development of the forces of production. In practice, communist regimes tended to develop 
forces of production by investment in heavy industry, mining, and massive irrigation and 
hydro-electric projects. While the case-study literature on communist regimes finds it 
difficult to disentangle this ideology from other variables such as relative under-development, 
it is frequently held to be one factor lying behind such problems as heavy air and water 
pollution in the Soviet Union (Oldfield 2005, 21-42). Beside ideology, it is commonly held 
that Soviet central planning was wasteful of resources, because inputs and use of pollution 
sinks came un-priced to enterprises bent on plan fulfillment, and led to under-investment in 
cleaner plant, because of short-term pressures to maximize production (Ericson 1991). 
Another reason to control for communist legacies is that many single-party regimes are 
associated with communist/socialist experience; we need to tease out the effect of communist 
legacies in order to make it a convincing case that it is the size of the constituencies (and state 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
not include monarchies and only included data on regimes that endured more than three 
years. Wright 2008 updated the Geddes data to include monarchies, such as Saudi Arabia, 
Morocco, and Kuwait. 
16
 Between 1946 and 2003, roughly 22% of the total observations are coded as hybrid 
regimes; so we are not losing too many observations. More importantly, our key finding 
concerning the positive relationship between state capacity and pollution is robust to the 
inclusion of these hybrid regimes.  
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capacity) that impact the environment.
17
 We therefore add a dummy variable indicating 
whether a country has ever been a communist or socialist regime.
18
  
Further Control Variables:  We include both GDP per capita (in purchasing power parity) 
and its squared term in the model to capture the possibility that there is a curvilinear 
relationship between wealth and environmental protection. This is to test the Environmental 
Kuznets Curve argument that there is a U shape relationship between economic development 
and environmental protection. Moreover, rapid economic growth may generate forms of 
environmental damage that are hard to cope with in the short-term. We therefore include 
GDP growth rate. Our model also includes the share of industrial production in GDP 
(Industry) because industry is often associated with higher levels of pollution than the service 
and agricultural sectors. We further control for Fuel exports (as a percentage of merchandise 
exports) given the negative environmental impacts associated with the exploration, drilling, 
and extraction of fossil fuels (O’Rourke and Connolly 2003).   
We include two demographic variables, Population density (population divided by land 
area) and Urban population (as a share of total population) to control for demographic 
influences on pollution levels. Countries with high population density might prioritize 
development at the expense of environmental protection. Large urban population might also 
increase the environmental burden on the country; but urban population is also likely to be 
associated with environmental activism and protection.
19
 We controls for Trade openness (the 
sum of imports and exports as a percentage of GDP) which has been used extensively in the 
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 The correlation between communist legacies and single-party regime is indeed 0.45 in our 
data.  
18
 Countries that have been coded 1 for this dummy variable and potentially enter the 
empirically analysis after deletion of missing data are Albania, Bulgaria, China, Hungary, 
Mongolia, Poland, Laos, Mozambique, Angola, Cambodia, Vietnam, Somalia, and 
Afghanistan.  
19
 Data on GDP per capita, GDP growth rate, industrial production, oil exports, population 
density, and urban population are from the World Development Indicators (World Bank 
2008).  
18 
 
trade-environment literature to capture the effect of overall trade openness (de Soysa and 
Neumayer 2005).  
Finally, any account of environmental politics will be incomplete without taking into 
account societal demands for more/less environmental protection. We, like many previous 
studies, have implicitly assumed that the public demands a cleaner environment. However, 
how strong that demand is and to what extent people are willing to give up part of their 
income for environmental protection is largely unknown, especially for many authoritarian 
states. It is therefore important to control for relative demand for environmental public goods. 
However, data on public opinion concerning environmental demand are limited, especially 
for developing countries (Kvaløy, Henning Finseraas and Listhaug 2012).
20
 Income is 
probably the best available proxy. Indeed, this is another justification for including GDP per 
capita and its square term.  
Insert Table 1 about here.  
Another important societal demand is associated with the energy intensive sectors and 
the common assumption is that these sectors prefer less stringent environmental regulations. 
For example, Ward and Cao 2012 have shown that in the OECD context, the larger the size 
of these sectors, the lower the level of environmental taxation in a country. Energy intensive 
sectors can be identified, for instance by reference to those included in the EU’s CO2 
emissions trading scheme such as electricity generation, cement production, and glass making. 
In principle, the power of such sectors could be measured by their contribution to GDP, but 
available breakdowns of GDP are not fine enough to make this practicable. Things are more 
straightforward on the production side. We use the World Development Indicators (WDI) 
                                                          
20
 The World Values Survey and European Value Survey are the best sources for public 
opinion data on environmental demand in terms of country and year coverage. These surveys 
have a number of questions relating to the environment, depending on wave and country 
concerned (World Values Survey 2009). However, the number of authoritarian country-years 
covered by these surveys is very limited.  
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data on national energy production in ktonnes of oil equivalent and divided by real GDP. This 
gives energy production per unit of real gross domestic product (Energy production). Table 1 
presents the correlation statistics for the variables used in the paper.  
Empirical Findings 
We first model air and water pollution in a country random effects model with a first-order 
autoregressive process to capture the within-country serial correlation of the data. While the 
random-effects in our model are conceptually analogous to the country-fixed effects usually 
employed in Time-Series-Cross-Sectional data (TSCS) analyses, they have certain statistical 
advantages. Unlike random effects models, fixed effects models use one degree of freedom 
for each unit. Such loss of information inflates the standard errors and makes the estimates of 
the coefficients less precise. This is important for our analysis because missing data (on RPC 
and Tax ratio, for example) already reduces the number of countries to 39-46 (time period 
1980-2003). More importantly, the authoritarian regime type variables are often slow-moving 
or even time-invariant. It is well known that estimating country fixed effects with slow-
moving and time-invariant variables is often problematic.
21
  
The model can be written as , where   is the population 
intercept,  represents mean-zero random unit intercepts and is normally distributed.  is 
the linear covariates and an estimate of their impact on the dependent variable. Residuals are 
further decomposed as  , where is the first order autoregressive 
correlation term (AR1), and follows the normal distribution . We also include 
year fixed effects to control for common exogenous shocks (e.g., sharp increases in 
international oil price) and region dummy variables to control any potential regional effects 
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 Even though recent literature has proposed statistical tools to deal with this, see for 
example, Plümper and Troeger 2007, there is still debate on whether the proposed estimators 
indeed solve the problem and about  which estimator(s) outperform the others (Greene 2010; 
but also see Plümper and Troeger 2011).      
20 
 
that might not be captured by the explanatory variables.
22
 We present the empirical findings 
in Table 2-4 with one table for each type of pollutant. We have two measures for state 
capacity here --- relative political capacity (RPC) and Tax ratio (of GDP). Thus for each 
pollutant, we present two model specifications: each model specification includes basic 
social-economic control variables from GDP per capita to energy production, 
communist/socialist legacies, and region variables.  
The results from SO2 regressions (Table 2) show that there is a positive association 
between state extractive capacity, either measured by RPC or Tax ratio, and the logged level 
of SO2 per capita emission for authoritarian states. Not only is the association statistically 
significant across both model specifications, but also the magnitude of the association is 
substantively important.  For instance, a coefficient of about 0.12 associated with the RPC 
measure suggests that on average, a one standard deviation upward shift in a country’s 
relative political capacity, which is about 0.54 in our sample of observations, is expected to 
be associated with an increase in annual SO2 emissions of about 0.07 kilograms per-capita in 
logarithm. Note that the average of SO2 per capita emission in the sample is about 1.47 
kilograms per-capita in logarithm.   
Interestingly, we also find an important effect for authoritarian regime types. With 
military regime as the baseline regime type, single-party regimes are associated with higher 
levels of SO2 per capita emission. With coefficients of personalist regimes and monarchies 
not statistically different from that of the baseline military regimes, a coefficient around 0.8 
associated with single-party regimes suggests that on a yearly basis, a single-party regime on 
average emits an additional 0.8 kilograms per-capita (in logarithm) of SO2  more than all 
other types of authoritarian regimes --- this is more than half of the average SO2 per capita 
emission level in the sample (again, the mean is about 1.47 kilograms per-capita in 
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 The region dummies are East Asia, Eastern Europe & post-Soviet, Latin America, North 
Africa & Middle East, South-East Asia, South Asia, and Sub-Saharan Africa.  
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logarithm).
23
 Furthermore, GDP per capita and its square term are significantly associated 
with emission and the signs of coefficients indicate an inverted U-shaped environmental 
Kuznets curve: per capita SO2 emission goes up with wealth until reaching a threshold after 
which increasing wealth decreases emission. Finally, urban population and energy production 
are also positively associated with SO2 emission.  
Insert Table 2-4 about here.  
Table 3 presents the empirical findings for CO2 emission. In contrast to the case of SO2 
emissions, here we do not find evidence for an inverted U-shaped environmental Kuznets 
curve, though the negative impacts of urban population and energy production are still 
statistically significant. In terms of the effects of regime types, the relationship between 
single-party regimes and emission is not significant. Moreover, similar to the case of SO2 
emission, both RPC and Tax ratio increase CO2 emission significantly. In terms of the 
regional effects, with the baseline region being East Asia, we find that countries from South 
Asia emit significantly less CO2.   
Slightly different from the findings of two major air pollutants, those from BOD 
regressions (table 4) suggest that few covariates in our model actually have any impact on 
this type of water pollution. Among all the control variables, we only find that GDP growth 
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 In terms of the potential explanations for the positive relationship between single-party 
regimes and SO2 emissions, we think this might be a function of the size of the key 
constituencies associated with authoritarian regimes. Among all four types of authoritarian 
regimes, single-party regimes are often associated with the largest size of key constituencies 
which mainly include the military and party members. For example, there are about 77.9 
million (in 2009) members of the Chinese Communist Party, which is roughly 6% of the 
population; the Communist Party of Vietnam has 3. 6 million members: roughly 4% of the 
population. Notoriously, the PRI in Mexico also included quite large groups of farmers and 
trade-unions in the movement. Larger key constituencies require more payoffs, often in the 
form of private goods, from the ruler assuming that she/he wants to stay in power and the best 
way to do so is to keep these constituencies happy. Higher level of private good provisions 
often implies a reduction in public goods which might also include the environmental type --- 
this might cause the reduction in environmental qualities.  
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reduces and urban population increases BOD per capita. We might simply need better quality 
data for BOD discharges: for the same time period and a similar set of countries, the available 
number of observations for the BOD regressions is almost one third lower than those in the 
SO2 and CO2 regressions. However, even with few observations, state extractive capacity 
measured as both RPC and Tax ratio is still positively associated with BOD pollution.   
Insert Table 5 about here.  
Our strongest finding is the positive effect of state capacity on pollution. In order to test 
whether this result is robust to other estimation strategies, we ran OLS regressions with 
lagged dependent variable and country and year fixed effects. Adding country fixed effects 
essentially makes our estimation rely exclusively on temporal variation in the data. A 
country’s state capacity, at least for those two measures in our data, does not change much 
over time. Therefore, we think that a fixed effects model, by giving up cross-sectional 
variation of independent variables in explaining air and water pollution, is a stronger test for 
the state capacity argument. Moreover, we choose not to include regime type variables and 
the dummy variable for communist/socialist regime because they are almost time-invariant. 
The results from fixed effects models are reported in Table 5. Here, except for one out of the 
six model specifications --- using RPC for SO2, we find that both measures of state capacity 
are still positively associated with pollutions at reasonably high statistical significance 
levels.
24
       
 
Insert Figure 1 about here. 
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Also note that in the case of SO2 and CO2, the sizes of estimated mean coefficients for 
state capacity variables in fixed effects models are smaller than those from random effects 
models.
  
On the other hand, in the case of BOD, the estimated mean coefficients for state 
capacity variables are similar in size in random and fixed effects models. This seems to 
suggest that cross-sectional variation in the state capacity variables accounts much more for 
the variation in air pollution (SO2 and CO2) than that in water pollution (BOD).   
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Finally, we have argued in the theoretical section that our model of environmental 
investment gap is specific to the context of authoritarian politics. Democratic politics would 
change the incentives of the ruler because democratic incumbents on average place more 
weight on maximizing social welfare rather than rent (Lake and Baum 2001). Moreover, they 
are more likely to be institutionally constrained by de facto opposition parties in the 
legislature whose policy preferences may diverge from the incumbents’. To empirically test 
our theoretical expectation, we add polity score and its interactive term with the state capacity 
variables to the fixed effects model specifications in Table 5. An interactive model is ideal to 
test the domain restriction of our theory: if our model only works for non-democracies, we 
should see the positive effect of state capacity on pollution indicators disappear in 
democracies. Figure 1 shows the conditional effects of polity score on the state capacity 
variables across pollution types with mean estimates and confidence intervals.
25
 Across all 
six sub-figures, we observe the same pattern that confirms our theoretical expectation. State 
capacity, measure either by relative political capacity (RPC) or tax ratio, is positively 
associated with pollution when polity score is at the low and/or medium level.
26
 The positive 
effects become smaller with increasing level of polity scores and eventually disappear 
(judging by the associated statistical significance indicated by the 95% confidence intervals) 
when polity score reaches around -3 for SO2 (Figure 1(b)), and around 3 for CO2 and 
BOD(Figure 1(c) to (f)).
27
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 We have included an online appendix with more details on testing the domain restriction of 
our theory at authors’ websites.  
26
 This positive relationship is also statistically significant except when we use RPC for the 
case of SO2 (Figure 1(a)). 
27 Polity score is bounded between -10 and 10 with higher values indicating more democratic 
systems. The common cut-off point for democracies often used in previous studies is a polity 
score of 6 and that for autocracies -6. The middle category is often referred to as anocracies.  
24 
 
Conclusion and Discussion on Future Research 
In this paper, we present a model of environmental politics in the authoritarian world. 
We show that it is typically the case that the larger the state’s capacity, the worse its 
environmental quality: while both infrastructural investment and environmental protection 
increase with higher state capacity, the former increases at a faster rate, which enlarges the 
environmental investment gap. Our theoretical model predicts that greater state capacity 
should be associated with bad environmental outcomes in the authoritarian regimes. We test 
our theory for three types of major air and water pollutants (SO2, CO2, and BOD). We find 
that state capacity is associated with higher levels of all three types of pollutants in 
authoritarian states. 
The findings presented in this paper contribute to the literature on environmental 
politics and to a broader literature on the politics of development in numerous ways. First, 
some studies that address the debate on the impact of democracy on environmental 
pollution
28
 find that democracies with greater state capacity are associated with higher 
environmental quality (Janicke 1997; Ehrhardt-Martinez 2002). The central result in this 
paper, however, suggests that unlike democracies, greater state capacity in autocracies 
generates a larger environmental investment gap that leads to more environmental 
degradation. This result at least partially challenges the conventional belief that higher state 
capacity in developing countries – where authoritarian regimes exist – promotes effective 
implementation of optimal policies (e.g. “better” environmental policies) that enhances social 
welfare (Herbst 2000; Van de Walle 2001). Indeed, our study shows that the effect of state 
capacity on especially environmental outcomes critically depends on the institutional context, 
specifically the type of political regime in place.   
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 See e.g., Li and Reuveny 2006, Scruggs 2009, Bernauer and Koubi 2009. 
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Second, recent research provides valuable insights on how the impact of authoritarian 
regimes on outcomes as diverse as economic growth and the propensity for dictators to resort 
to conflict (e.g., Gandhi 2008; Wright 2008; Weeks 2011). Yet extant studies on autocracies 
have paid less attention toward systematically theorizing the effect of autocratic states on a 
substantively important outcome: environmental quality.  The results presented in this paper 
take a critical step forward with respect to understanding how and when the quality of the 
environment can deteriorate in authoritarian regimes. As such, our main finding may provide 
a useful foundation for future research on the link between autocracies and environmental 
quality. Third, recall that a key assumption in our model is that the authoritarian ruler seeks to 
maximize his discounted rent. Notwithstanding this assumption, an additional claim that 
emerges from our model is that leaders in authoritarian states will invest in infrastructure 
even when they seek to maximize their expected rent. This claim calls into question extant 
theoretical arguments which posit that autocrats as “roving bandits” often fail to adequately 
provide public-goods such as infrastructure investment primarily because they are more 
focused on being predatory by extracting rent (e.g., McGuire and Olson 1995). It may be 
worthwhile to assess whether our supplementary theoretical claim mentioned above is 
empirically valid.       
  The results reported in this paper also provide two main policy predictions. First, our 
model predicts that environmental problems will get worse as a function of state capacity as 
long as infrastructural public goods investment is more productive of surplus than investment 
in environmental regulation. If there came a point where environmental regulation mattered 
more, the relationship reverses, though. This may shed some light on recent developments in 
China where the five year plan for the period 2011 to 2015 has a strong environmental focus 
(BBC News, 3rd March 2011) and Premier Wen Jiabao announced a reduction in target 
26 
 
growth rates from 7.5% to 7% partly to address environmental concerns (BBC News, 28
th
 
February 2011).  
There is no doubt that China faces enormous environmental challenges (World Bank 
2001), partly due to its very rapid economic development over the last two decades. Some 
believe that poor environmental quality and resource shortages will increasingly constrain 
China’s economic growth, while increasing environmental protest will generate strains for the 
regime (Economy 2004; Grumbine 2007). It may be that China is on the cusp at which its 
considerable state capacity will turn to an advantage from the environmental point of view, 
reducing the environmental investment gap if it grows. Second, if the quality of the 
environment declines further in authoritarian regimes with greater state capacity, then leaders 
of such states may become more sensitized toward the long-term negative externalities of 
environmental degradation. If so, then we may potentially observe such autocratic leaders to 
be more receptive toward international policy initiatives that seek to curtail environmental 
pollution via multilateral cooperation between states at the systemic level. 
There are many assumptions in our model that require further investigation. Not all 
authoritarian regimes can be plausibly characterized as pure rent-seekers (Wintrobe 1990). If 
a leader was purely concerned to maximize his chances of retaining tenure, increasing state 
capacity might be associated with worse environmental quality, but for different reasons to 
the ones we suggest. If the leader had to pay some attention to all members of the selectorate 
by paying them off with private goods, and if this necessitated building state capacity through 
time, we would expect greater pressure on the profits of enterprises in the private sector, 
damaging their ability to invest in cleaner technology. We might also expect direct 
environmental effects due to a bias towards current consumption and further attempts to 
suppress dissent among the general population, including environmental dissent.  
27 
 
Although there is certainly evidence from large scale social surveys and from other 
sources for environmental concern in authoritarian systems (World Values Survey 2009), it is 
plausible that the degree of concern varies. If authoritarian leaders have to pay attention to 
dissent both within the selectorate and (to some extent) among the wider citizenry, 
environmental demand should matter to their behavior, too, if they have the capacity to meet 
it. This suggests an interaction between demand and state capacity. As it is the case that a 
variety of causal mechanisms could explain our empirical results, detailed empirical work 
will be required to tell which are the most plausible.
29
 Lastly, we also found that single-party 
authoritarian states are positively associated with SO2 emissions. It is beyond the scope of 
this paper to study in more detail the link between authoritarian regime-types and 
environmental pollution. But researchers may gain valuable insights by evaluating how 
different authoritarian institutions may influence environmental quality.  
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 A more direct test of our causal story is look at the correlations between state capacity and 
regimes types on the one hand, and government spending patterns across different types of 
public goods on the other hand. More specifically, the differences between government 
spending on economic affairs (e.g., on mining, mineral resources, manufacturing and 
construction) and the environment can be operationalized as the environmental investment 
gap variable. However, data on government environmental spending (e.g., from IMF’s 
Government Financial Statistics) are often missing, especially for developing countries and 
for the pre-1990s period.   
28 
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Appendix A: Derivation of Conditions in Formal Model 
 
Proof of Lemma 1: Assuming that constraints C1-C5 are slack, by complementary slackness 
Lagrange multipliers associated with these constraints are zero, and the Lagrangian for the 
ruler’s program is R∑. Notice that because of the Cobb-Douglas surplus production function, 
R∑ is strictly concave in It, Et and Ct, so first-order conditions are sufficient for an optimum. 
Notice that any optimal solution must have iT = eT = cT = 0: because investment only affect 
surplus after a lag, to plan to invest at time T has no value for the ruler because his term must 
have finished once the T-th period is over. 
           First we derive the value of partial derivative of surplus in period t+1 with respect to 
investments in period t that must hold in an optimum. The proof will be by backward 
induction from period T. For brevity we derive the condition for it, but analogous derivations 
apply for et and ct. For an optimum 
       δR∑/δiT-1 = 0 =  ΠT φ
T
  δYT/δiT-1   –    ΠT-1 φ
T-1
 pI 
Noting that ΠT-1 > 0 (because Π0 = 1 and πt > 0) and φ 
T-1
 > 0 (as φ > 0) we can simplify the 
right hand side by dividing through by these terms and recall that  ΠT  =  Π T-1 πT-1 
to get: 
        δYT/δiT-1    =    pI /φ πT-1 
Now for 0 ≤  t’ <  t” ≤ T 
                                          t”  
        δYt”/δit’  = Aα(I0  +  ∑ it )
α-1  
 Et”
β
  Ct”
γ  ……………(1) 
                                        t = 0 
So, in particular, for 0 ≤ t < T-1 
        δYT/δit  =  δYT/δiT-1  =   pI /φ πT-1   
Moving backward in time for an optimum 
       δR∑/δiT-2 = 0 =  ΠT-1 φ
T-1
  δYT-1/δiT-2   +  ΠT φ
T
  δYt/δiT-2   –    Π T-2 φ 
T-2
 pI 
Substituting for  δYt/δiT-2 and simplifying 
   0    =    πT-2 φ  δYT-1/δiT-2    +    ((πT-2 πT-1 φ 
2
 pI)/φπT-1)  -    pI    or  
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   δYT-1/δiT-2    =     pI(1  -  φπT-2)/φπT-2      
         Now if we can show that δYt”+1/δit”      =     pI(1  -  φπt”)/φπt” for all t” such that t’+1 ≤  t” 
≤ T-2 implies that  
            δYt’+1/δit’      =     pI(1  -  φπt’)/φπt’ 
 then we can conclude by backwards induction that for  0 ≤ t < T-2  
            δYt+1/δit      =     pI(1  -  φπt)/φπt 
for we have already shown that this is true for t = T-2.  We have  
       δR∑/δit’ = 0 =  Πt’+1 φ
t’+1
  δYt’+1/δit’ 
                          +   Πt’+2 φ
t’+2
  δYt’+2/δit’ 
                          + 
                           . 
                           . 
                           . 
                           +   ΠT-1 φ
T-1
  δYT-1/δit’   
 
                           +   ΠT    φ
T
    δYT/δit’   
   
- Πt’ φ
t’
 pI       ………………(2) 
 
 
It will be convenient to refer to the sum of the inner terms in expression 2 as Ω. Noting that by 
expression 1 δYT/δit’  = δYT/δiT-1 and   δYT-1/δit’  = δYT-1/δiT-2 and substituting, 
the last two terms in Ω sum to 
            pI ((φ
T-1
 ΠT-1(1 – φπT-2 )/φπT-2 )   + φ
T
 ΠT/φπT-1) 
= 
           pI (φ 
T-2
 ΠT-2 -  φ 
T-1
 Π T-1   + φ 
T-1
 Π T-1) 
= 
            pI  φ
T-2
 ΠT-2 
Proceeding in a similar manner the sum of the last three terms in Ω is  
 
 
 
Ω  =  
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            pI ((φ
T-2
 ΠT-2(1 – φπT-3 )/φπT-3 )   + φ
T-2
 ΠT-2) or 
            pI  φ
T-3
 ΠT-3 
and more generally the sum of term t* and above in Ω is 
           pI ((φ
t*
 Πt*(1 – φπt* )/φπt*)   + φ
t*
 Πt*) or 
            pI  φ
t*-1
 Πt*-1 
So 
        δR∑/δit’ = 0 =  Πt’+1 φ
t’+1
  δYt’+1/δit’  +     pI  φ
t*-1
 Πt*-1   -   pI φ
t’
 Π t or 
         φπt’ δYt’+1/δit’  +     pI φπt’  =    pI  or 
         δYt’+1/δit’  =   pI (1 - φπt’)/ φπt’ 
Summarizing we have shown that: i) δYT-1/δiT-2  =  pI(1  -  φπT-2)/φπT-2; and if for  all t” such 
that t’+1 ≤  t” ≤ T-2,  δYt”+1/δit”   =  pI(1  -  φπt”)/φπt”, then it follows that;  
ii)  δYt’+1/δit’  =   pI (1 - φπt’)/ φπt’. We conclude by backward induction that for 0 ≤ t ≤ T-2 
δYt+1/δit  =   pI (1 - φπt)/ φπt. Using analogous arguments we can show that  δYT/δeT-1  =   pE/ 
φπT-1 and  δYT/δcT-1  =   pC/ φπT-1, while for 0 ≤ t ≤ T-2 
δYt+1/δet  =   pE (1 - φπt)/ φπt and 
δYt+1/δct  =   pC (1 - φπt)/ φπt. 
Thus for 0 ≤ t ≤ T- 1 the ratios of the partial derivatives of surplus in the next period with 
respect to investments is equal to the ratio of the price of the investments. Specifically 
δYt+1/δit       =        pI      =       α (Et + et)  =    α Et+1’ 
__________                        ___                       ___________               _____  
            ……..     (3) 
 δYt+1/δet               pE                β (It +  it)         β I t+1’          
 
 
δYt+1/δit          =        pI      =     α (Ct + ct)  =       α Ct+1’    
__________                              ___                     _____________         _______   
        ………    (4) 
 δYt+1/δct                   pC             γ( It  + it)            γ It+1’ 
 
 
 δYt+1/δet        =        pE     =        β(Ct + ct)      =     βCt+1’    
___________                           ___                       _____________              ______           ……….    (5) 
 δYt+1/δct                  pC               γ(Et  + et)              γEt+1’ 
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Suppose that the ruler’s total investment in infrastructure, environment and state capacity is kt, 
so that pI it   + pEet   + pCct   = kt  or  
pI(It+1’ – It)   + pE (Et+1’ – Et)   + pC (Ct+1’ – Ct)   = kt         …………                 (6) 
 
Then solving (1) through (4) simultaneously,  
 
It+1’   =         α(kt  + pIIt + pEEt + pCCt) 
               
_____________________________ 
                         pI(α + β + γ) 
 
Et+1’   =      β(kt  + pIIt + pEEt + pCCt)  
               
___________________________ 
                       pE(α + β + γ) 
 
Ct+1’  =        γ(kt  + pIIt + pEEt + pCCt) 
              
________________________________ 
                         pC(α + β + γ) 
 
And as Dt+ 1  =  (It+1’  – Et+1’)  
 
Dt +1  =    (αpE – βpI) ( kt  + pIIt + pEEt + pCCt)                       …………             (7) 
            
__________________________________________ 
                        pIpE(α + β + γ) 
 
Proof of Proposition 1: From the expression in (7), we obtain 
             δ Dt +1 /δCt   =  pC(αpE – βpI) / pIpE(α + β + γ)             .………..              (8)  
So the environmental investment gap at time t +1 increases with state capacity at time t so 
long as (αpE – βpI) > 0, as asserted in the text. Moreover as  
             δεt+1 /δCt   = δεt+1 /δDt+1 * δ Dt +1 /δCt                                  …………                (9) 
Environmental quality at time t+1 falls with state capacity at time t so long as (αpE – βpI) > 0. 
Proof of claim 1: From the solution for It+1’ in Lemma 1, we find that 
             δIt+1’ /δCt   =  αpC / pI(α + β + γ) > 0                        .………..              (10)  
Likewise, from the solution for Et+1’ in Lemma 1, we obtain 
δEt+1’ /δCt   =  βpC / pE(α + β + γ) > 0                        .………..              (11)    
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Figure 1: Testing the effects of state capacity, conditional on regime types (polity): In all figures, the 
long-dashed lines are the upper and lower bounds of the 95% confidence intervals of the estimated 
effect; the dark line in between the dashed lines represents the mean coefficient estimated. The 
distributions of the polity scores variable are displayed by their histograms, in gray color, with 
frequencies shown by the vertical axis on right-hand side of each figure. 
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Table 1: Correlation among covariates   
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
1: RPC 1.00 0.91 -0.14 0.23 -0.06 -0.05 0.17 -0.09 0.10 -0.04 -0.07 0.07 0.12 0.12 -0.13 
2: Tax ratio 0.91 1.00 -0.15 0.25 -0.09 -0.04 0.11 0.05 0.35 -0.04 0.04 0.19 0.31 0.30 0.05 
3: Personalist -0.14 -0.15 1.00 -0.57 -0.26 -0.31 -0.23 -0.29 -0.25 -0.11 -0.09 -0.19 -0.09 -0.15 -0.13 
4: Single party 0.23 0.25 -0.57 1.00 -0.29 -0.34 0.43 -0.07 0.01 0.04 0.15 -0.02 0.05 -0.14 -0.21 
5: Military -0.06 -0.09 -0.26 -0.29 1.00 -0.16 -0.13 -0.05 -0.04 0.02 -0.02 0.02 -0.24 -0.06 -0.07 
6: Monarchy -0.05 -0.04 -0.31 -0.34 -0.16 1.00 -0.16 0.51 0.36 0.08 -0.07 0.26 0.30 0.41 0.48 
7: Socialist/Communist 
legacies 
0.17 0.11 -0.23 0.43 -0.13 -0.16 1.00 -0.09 0.11 0.02 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.04 -0.03 
8: GDP per capita -0.09 0.05 -0.29 -0.07 -0.05 0.51 -0.09 1.00 0.55 0.03 0.29 0.66 0.25 0.32 0.50 
9: Industry (% of GDP) 0.10 0.35 -0.25 0.01 -0.04 0.36 0.11 0.55 1.00 0.06 0.03 0.58 0.42 0.59 0.61 
10: GDP growth rate -0.04 -0.04 -0.11 0.04 0.02 0.08 0.02 0.03 0.06 1.00 0.07 -0.00 0.05 0.06 0.04 
11: Population density -0.07 0.04 -0.09 0.15 -0.02 -0.07 -0.03 0.29 0.03 0.07 1.00 0.31 -0.12 -0.03 -0.14 
12: Urban population (% 
pop.) 
0.07 0.19 -0.19 -0.02 0.02 0.26 -0.03 0.66 0.58 -0.00 0.31 1.00 0.26 0.37 0.23 
13: Trade openness 0.12 0.31 -0.09 0.05 -0.24 0.30 -0.03 0.25 0.42 0.05 -0.12 0.26 1.00 0.21 0.32 
14: Fuel export (% of exp) 0.12 0.30 -0.15 -0.14 -0.06 0.41 -0.04 0.32 0.59 0.06 -0.03 0.37 0.21 1.00 0.73 
15: Energy production (% 
GDP) 
-0.13 0.05 -0.13 -0.21 -0.07 0.48 -0.03 0.50 0.61 0.04 -0.14 0.23 0.32 0.73 1.00 
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Table 2: Models on SO2 per capita emission: using RPC and tax ratio for state capacity.   
 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 Coef.  σ p(>|t|) Coef.  σ p(>|t|) 
(Intercept) -9.5823 3.193 0.003 -8.1188 3.040 0.008 
GDP per capita 2.3114 0.686 0.001 1.7325 0.684 0.012 
GDP per capita
2
 
-0.1223 0.040 0.002 -0.0893 0.040 0.028 
Industry (% of GDP) 0.0012 0.004 0.723 0.0004 0.004 0.917 
GDP growth rate -0.0003 0.002 0.847 -0.0008 0.002 0.607 
Population density -0.0318 0.135 0.814 0.1529 0.136 0.262 
Urban population (% pop.) 0.0207 0.008 0.011 0.0249 0.008 0.002 
Trade openness 0.0351 0.073 0.632 0.0318 0.076 0.678 
Fuel export (% of exp) -0.0147 0.008 0.054 -0.0111 0.009 0.211 
Energy production (% GDP) 0.1459 0.090 0.106 0.1886 0.092 0.041 
Socialist/Communist legacies -0.6193 0.793 0.441 0.0958 0.178 0.591 
 Regime (baseline: Military):       
Monarchy 0.7937 0.563 0.169 0.6291 0.470 0.189 
Personalist 0.0766 0.409 0.853 0.1182 0.366 0.749 
Single party 0.8359 0.386 0.039 0.8711 0.336 0.014 
 State Capacity:       
RPC 0.1194 0.044 0.007    
Tax ratio (of GDP)    0.7060 0.275 0.011 
 Region (baseline: East Asia):       
East Europe & post-Soviet    0.0332 0.643 0.959 
Latin America -0.6884 0.852 0.426 -0.3647 0.662 0.585 
North Africa & Middle East -0.6831 0.864 0.435 -0.3173 0.632 0.619 
South-East Asia -0.6096 0.871 0.490 -0.5023 0.638 0.437 
South Asia -1.7929 1.256 0.164 -1.2588 0.791 0.120 
Sub-Saharan Africa -0.5898 0.912 0.523 -0.4048 0.603 0.506 
 AR1:   0.971   0.969 
StdDev(Intercept
i
)   0.0002   0.0003 
StdDev(Residual)   0.731   0.725 
N of countries   39   46 
N of Observations   370   390 
Year fixed effects   1980-2001   1980-1999 
Year fixed effects are estimated for all models but not reported because of space limit. 
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Table 3: Models on CO2 per capita emission: using RPC and tax ratio for state capacity.   
 
 Model 3 Model 4 
 Coef.  σ p(>|t|) Coef.  σ p(>|t|) 
(Intercept) -4.3460 2.492 0.082 -1.9656 2.155 0.363 
GDP per capita 0.3748 0.515 0.467 -0.0828 0.471 0.861 
GDP per capita
2
 
0.0175 0.029 0.554 0.0337 0.028 0.237 
Industry (% of GDP) -0.0016 0.003 0.574 -0.0021 0.003 0.523 
GDP growth rate -0.0017 0.002 0.293 0.0002 0.002 0.899 
Population density 0.0353 0.124 0.777 0.0627 0.124 0.614 
Urban population (% pop.) 0.0082 0.005 0.106 0.0179 0.005 0.001 
Trade openness 0.0579 0.051 0.254 0.0569 0.055 0.304 
Fuel export (% of exp) 0.0042 0.007 0.517 0.0081 0.007 0.279 
Energy production (% GDP) 0.1830 0.082 0.027 0.2206 0.082 0.008 
Socialist/Communist legacies -0.8809 0.772 0.263 0.0405 0.167 0.809 
 Regime (baseline: Military):       
Monarchy 0.3145 0.547 0.569 -0.0665 0.450 0.883 
Personalist -0.3390 0.410 0.415 -0.1503 0.356 0.675 
Single party 0.1958 0.385 0.615 0.2137 0.331 0.522 
 State Capacity:       
RPC 0.1299 0.036 0.000    
Tax ratio (of GDP)    0.7367 0.224 0.001 
 Region (baseline: East Asia):       
East Europe & post-Soviet    -0.0516 0.627 0.935 
Latin America -0.8429 0.841 0.324 -1.1387 0.634 0.081 
North Africa & Middle East -0.3564 0.858 0.681 -0.3467 0.616 0.577 
South-East Asia -0.3679 0.868 0.675 -0.6300 0.633 0.326 
South Asia -2.5810 1.187 0.038 -2.2210 0.761 0.006 
Sub-Saharan Africa -1.0789 0.890 0.235 -1.4963 0.591 0.016 
 AR1:   0.414   0.349 
StdDev(Intercept
i
)   0.696   0.668 
StdDev(Residual)   0.173   0.170 
N of countries   39   46 
N of Observations   422   390 
Year fixed effects   1980-2003   1980-1999 
Note: Year fixed effects are estimated for all models; not reported because of space limit. 
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Table 4: Models on BOD per capita emission: using RPC and tax ratio for state capacity.   
 
 Model 5 Model 6 
 Coef.  σ p(>|t|) Coef.  σ p(>|t|) 
(Intercept) -5.6892 3.969 0.153 -2.7238 3.802 0.474 
GDP per capita -0.4822 0.900 0.593 -1.1398 0.880 0.196 
GDP per capita
2
 
0.0518 0.054 0.336 0.0902 0.053 0.093 
Industry (% of GDP) -0.0065 0.005 0.219 -0.0088 0.006 0.156 
GDP growth rate -0.0054 0.003 0.035 -0.0065 0.003 0.020 
Population density 0.0609 0.134 0.649 0.1553 0.139 0.266 
Urban population (% pop.) 0.0199 0.009 0.022 0.0185 0.008 0.030 
Trade openness -0.0508 0.114 0.657 -0.0346 0.116 0.765 
Fuel export (% of exp) -0.0046 0.015 0.765 -0.0009 0.018 0.959 
Energy production (% GDP) -0.0865 0.156 0.579 -0.2120 0.157 0.179 
Socialist/Communist legacies -1.3459 0.792 0.100 0.0521 0.240 0.828 
 Regime (baseline: Military):       
Monarchy -0.9937 0.541 0.077 -0.7696 0.458 0.102 
Personalist -0.6383 0.388 0.111 -0.6370 0.350 0.078 
Single party -0.2321 0.369 0.534 -0.1083 0.322 0.739 
 State Capacity:       
RPC 0.1396 0.067 0.039    
Tax ratio (of GDP)    0.7596 0.434 0.082 
 Region (baseline: East 
Asia): 
      
East Europe & post-Soviet    0.3859 0.620 0.538 
Latin America -0.5239 0.800 0.518 -0.8466 0.642 0.197 
North Africa & Middle East -0.4746 0.810 0.563 -0.9369 0.602 0.129 
South-East Asia 0.4594 0.808 0.574 -0.0768 0.596 0.898 
South Asia 1.0031 1.213 0.415 -0.4098 0.742 0.584 
Sub-Saharan Africa -0.3502 0.867 0.689 -1.0370 0.570 0.078 
 AR1:   0.917   0.856 
StdDev(Intercept
i
)   0.358   0.492 
StdDev(Residual)   0.597   0.472 
N of countries   39   43 
N of Observations   302   300 
Year fixed effects   1980-2003   1980-1999 
Note: Year fixed effects are estimated for all models; not reported because of space limit. 
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Table 5: OLS with lagged dependent variable and country and year fixed effects: using RPC and tax ratio as state capacity.   
 
 SO2 per capita CO2 per capita BOD per capita 
 Coef.  σ p(>|t|) Coef.  σ p(>|t|) Coef.  σ p(>|t|) Coef.  σ p(>|t|) Coef.  σ p(>|t|) Coef.  σ p(>|t|) 
(Intercept) -0.903 2.558 0.724 0.400 1.983 0.840 -1.771 1.988 0.373 -0.370 1.781 0.835 2.071 7.320 0.777 2.862 4.739 0.546 
Lagged DV 0.778 0.039 0.000 0.730 0.042 0.000 0.393 0.047 0.000 0.312 0.052 0.000 0.726 0.045 0.000 0.638 0.059 0.000 
GDP per capita 0.069 0.588 0.906 -0.216 0.445 0.627 -0.342 0.450 0.447 -0.368 0.397 0.354 -1.655 1.651 0.317 -1.839 1.090 0.093 
GDP per capita
2
 
-0.001 0.033 0.968 0.016 0.027 0.542 0.044 0.025 0.080 0.044 0.024 0.066 0.118 0.095 0.216 0.129 0.069 0.063 
Industry (% of 
GDP) 
-0.000 0.002 0.989 -0.002 0.003 0.440 -0.000 0.002 0.671 -0.002 0.002 0.360 -0.007 0.005 0.198 -0.013 0.007 0.071 
GDP growth rate -0.000 0.001 0.888 0.000 0.001 0.931 0.000 0.001 0.822 0.001 0.001 0.395 -0.000 0.003 0.948 -0.001 0.003 0.633 
Population density 0.266 0.225 0.236 0.285 0.246 0.247 0.234 0.167 0.161 0.226 0.219 0.301 0.371 0.479 0.439 0.258 0.503 0.608 
Urban population 
(% pop.) 
0.007 0.005 0.132 0.003 0.005 0.587 0.002 0.003 0.607 0.006 0.005 0.219 0.016 0.010 0.100 0.026 0.012 0.041 
Trade openness 0.037 0.047 0.437 0.041 0.048 0.392 0.034 0.038 0.376 0.028 0.043 0.504 -0.035 0.108 0.744 -0.008 0.107 0.934 
Fuel export (% of 
exp) 
-0.009 0.006 0.152 -0.012 0.006 0.077 0.000 0.005 0.867 0.002 0.006 0.729 -0.024 0.018 0.189 -0.017 0.019 0.352 
Energy production 
(% GDP) 
-0.047 0.085 0.582 -0.023 0.087 0.793 0.162 0.069 0.019 0.174 0.075 0.022 -0.040 0.217 0.853 -0.183 0.256 0.475 
 State Capacity:                   
RPC 0.045 0.034 0.181    0.088 0.028 0.002    0.130 0.068 0.061    
Tax ratio (of GDP)    0.378 0.209 0.072    0.527 0.187 0.005    0.776 0.461 0.094 
N of countries   39   46   39   46   33   38 
N of Observations   368   389   420   389   259   265 
Ad. R-squared   0.979   0.980   0.991   0.989   0.935   0.943 
Year fixed effects   1980-01   1980-99   1980-03   1980-99   1981-03   1981-99 
Note: Year and country fixed effects are estimated for all models but not reported because of space limit. 
  
   
 
 
